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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1982, when Mexico came close to defaulting on its foreign
loans, American banks have been struggling to cope with the Latin
American debt crisis. It is estimated that Latin American debtor nations
owe 450 billion dollars to banks worldwide. One hundred and ten bil-
lion dollars of this debt is owed to United States commercial banks, and
the top fifteen United States commercial banks have lent seventy billion
dollars to the fifteen most indebted countries.
These banks have adopted a number of strategies for coping with
these debts including debt rescheduling, increasing loan loss reserves,
and debt-for-equity swaps. For example, in May 1987, Citicorp Chair-
man John Reed announced that Citicorp would set aside three billion
dollars in additional reserves to cover loan losses on its foreign debt expo-
sure. Most money center banks have followed Citicorp's lead and in-
creased their loss reserves.
Debt-for-equity swaps are an alternative that some Latin American
countries' have adopted to reduce their foreign currency denominated
debt. Debt-for-equity swaps permit banks with Latin American debt ex-
posure to convert the foreign denominated debt into equity holdings2 in
* The assistance of Bradley Schmarak, Esq. is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Countries that have established debt-for-equity swap programs include Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
2. See No Easy Path For Debt/Equity Swaps, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1988, at 2 [hereinafter
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the debtor country. Although the long-term utility of debt-for-equity
swaps is unclear, they have played a role in reducing Latin American
debt.
Countries that wish to use debt-for-equity swaps to reduce their for-
eign currency denominated debt usually establish a formal program,
although some debt-for-equity swaps are conducted informally.4 Formal
debt-for-equity programs require foreign banks or companies to make a
formal proposal for a debt-for-equity swap to the debtor country's cen-
tral bank. If the proposal is accepted, the foreign bank or multinational
company is allowed to present the debtor country's foreign denominated
debt at the country's central bank where the debt is paid either in full or
at a discount. The bank or company is subsequently required to invest
the proceeds in the debtor country in accordance with its previously sub-
mitted proposal. This investment is subject to various restrictions. Such
restrictions include limitations on the repatriation of dividends or capital
from the investment and restrictions on the sale of the stock acquired in
the swap.
These programs benefit the foreign banks which are able to reduce
their Lesser Developed Country (LDC) debt exposure, although in many
cases they are required to take on the unfamiliar role of managing a busi-
ness. The debtor nations benefit by reducing their foreign currency de-
nominated debt and the increased investment creates jobs that will
eventually help the country to repay its remaining debt. However, many
countries periodically suspend, discontinue, and subsequently reinstitute
their debt-for-equity swap programs, depending on the prevailing polit-
ical and economic climate. Also, the terms of these programs frequently
change, often with little or no advance notice. For example, Chile, Mex-
ico, and Brazil have periodically suspended their programs on the
grounds that the local currency generated by the swaps fuels inflation.5
Nigeria discontinued its program because it believed that the funds gen-
erated by debt-for-equity swaps were leaving the country via the black
market.
The future of debt-for-equity swap programs is unclear. Since
United States banks have survived the worst stage of the LDC debt crisis,
No Easy Path]. Investments made through debt equity swap programs have included hotels,
pulp plants and automobile factories.
3. See generally Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt, 65 FOREION POLICY 85 (1987);
Rubin, Guide to Debt Equity Swaps: Special Report No. 1104, ECONOMIST, 1987.
4. No Easy Path, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Paisley, Political Maneuvering May Spell The End of Brazil's Debt-For-Equity Swap
Program, AMERICAN BANKER, Nov. 28, 1988, at 14.
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their incentive to swap debt for equity may be diminished. Also, the
perceived disadvantages of debt-for-equity swaps may discourage LDCs
from instituting or continuing debt-for-equity swap programs. Finally,
indications of a "kinder and gentler" approach by the Bush administra-
tion to LDC debt may signal a return to forgiveness and a move away
from unconventional approaches to solving the debt crisis.6
Regardless of the future of debt equity swaps, there are substantial
tax implications for the billions of dollars that have been invested in
LDCs through debt-for-equity swap programs. This Article will ex-
amine the tax implications of debt-for-equity swap programs.
II. TAX IMPLICATIONS
A. Revenue Ruling 87-124
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not examine the United
States tax consequences of debt-for-equity swaps until late 1987, long af-
ter conversion programs had become fashionable. Unfortunately for
United States companies that have already swapped debt for equity or
who are considering swaps, the IRS has taken a troublesome position on
the potential income realization which stems from these transactions. In
Revenue Ruling 87-124,1 the IRS considered three different scenarios, all
based on the following underlying facts:
X, a United States commercial bank, holds debt of the Central Bank
of foreign country (FC). The debt obligation evidences a loan of one
hundred dollars that X made to the Central Bank. X's adjusted basis in
the obligation is one hundred dollars. Under the laws of FC, the obliga-
tion cannot be held by an FC entity. Y is a domestic corporation in the
United States. FX is a corporation organized in FC and engaged in busi-
ness in FC, but not in the United States. The local currency of FC is LC.
The exchange rate is one dollar to ten LCs.
FC has a program whereby a holder of the foreign debt can negoti-
ate with the Central Bank to deliver the FC debt to the Central Bank for
LCs if the holder agrees to invest the LCs in stock of a FC corporation or
otherwise use the LCs in FC in a manner approved in advance by the
government of FC. The program contains other restrictions and limita-
tions. The Ruling considered the following three situations:
Situation 1.
Y purchases the obligation from X for sixty dollars, its fair market
6. See N.Y. Times, April 13, 1981, at D1, col. 6; Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
7. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
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value in the secohidary market. The Central Bank redeems the note with
900 LCs and credits that amount in FX's account. FX then issues all of
its capital stock to Y.
Holding L
The IRS held that X, the United States commercial bank, recognizes
a loss of forty dollars ($100 - $60) on the sale of the obligation to Y. Y
takes an initial basis in the obligation of sixty dollars, its cost. The trans-
action is then viewed as a transfer by Y of the obligation to the Central
Bank for 900 LCs, which in turn is invested by Y in FX for stock in FX.
Y, the United States corporation, is required to recognize a gain on the
exchange of the obligation for the 900 LCs, to the extent that the fair
market value of 900 LCs exceeds Y's basis in the obligation, sixty dollars.
The fair market value of the 900 LCs is determined by taking into ac-
count all the facts and circumstances of the exchange. The IRS has not
elaborated on what facts or circumstances are significant. The IRS has
stated, however, that the limitation of Y's use of the 900 LCs under the
swap program will generally reduce their fair market value below ninety
dollars (the value of 900 LCs converted at the free market exchange
rate), and thereby reduce both the amount of the immediately recognized
gain and the basis in the FX stock. The Ruling does not, however, sug-
gest that these limitations reduce the value of the LCs to sixty dollars,
the price Y paid for the obligation. Y recognizes no gain on the exchange
of 900 LCs for FX stock because its basis in the LCs equals the stock's
fair market value.
Situation 2.
The facts are'the same as in Situation 1, except that instead of sell-
ing the obligation to Y for sixty dollars X delivers the obligation to the
Central Bank, which credits FX's account at the Central Bank with 900
LCs. FX then issues all of its capital stock to X.
Holding 2.
The IRS held that X recognizes a loss on the exchange of the obliga-
tion for the 900 LCs to the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis in
the obligation ($100) over the fair market value of the 900 LCs. X recog-
nizes no gain on the exchange of the 900 LCs for FX stock because its
basis in the LCs equals the stock's fair market value.
Situation 3.
The facts are the same as in Situation 2, except that instead of cred-
iting FX's account, the Central Bank credits the 900 LCs to an account
of Z, a United States charitable organization. Under the terms of the
[Vol. 12
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program, Z can only use the 900 LCs in FC for charitable purposes meet-
ing the requirements of Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Holding 3.
The IRS held that X will be treated as realizing the 900 LCs in ex-
change for the obligation and then contributing them to Z. X therefore
recognizes a loss on the exchange of the obligation for the 900 LCs to the
extent the adjusted basis in the obligation ($100) exceeds the fair market
value of the 900 LCs. If X and Z otherwise have satisfied all require-
ments of the Internal Revenue Code relating to charitable contributions,
X is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the 900 LCs at the time of the contribution.
The immediate gain recognition required by Revenue Ruling 87-124
could be an unwelcome consequence for companies considering partici-
pation in debt-for-equity swaps. Under the restrictions of most foreign
debt-for-equity swap programs, gain will be recognized and tax will be
due even though cash to pay the tax on the gain cannot be distributed
from the subsidiary.8 This detracts from the economic attractiveness of
this method of investment.
B. Minimizing The Effect of Revenue Ruling 87-124
1. Discounting the Value of the Local Currency
There are various ways to minimize or eliminate the negative tax
consequences of Revenue Ruling 87-124 in debt-for-equity swaps. First,
for tax purposes, a company could significantly discount the fair market
value of the local currency it receives and invests through the transac-
tion.9 Given the extensive limitations and restriction imposed by most
8. Although the specific terms of each country's debt-for-equity swap program are differ-
ent and frequently change, most countries impose restrictions on the repatriation of income
and capital from the investment purchased through the swap. Most countries prohibit capital
repatriation before the end of a specified period ranging from five years in the case of Bolivia
and Venezuela to twelve years in the case of Mexico, Ecuador and Brazil. Chile and Costa
Rica do not permit capital to be repatriated at terms more favorable than the terms of the
original debt. Restrictions on the repatriation of profits are also usually imposed. This may be
an absolute prohibition against repatriating profits for a certain period, a prohibition against
remitting more than a certain percentage of profits for a certain period or restricting the
amount of repatriated profits to the interest that would have been paid on the debt. Finally,
some countries limit the debt to equity investment to some percentage of the project cost. See
Rubin, supra note 3, at 100-01.
9. A taxpayer's gain on a sale or exchange is calculated by subtracting his adjusted basis
in the asset from the amount realized on the transaction. I.R.C. § 1001 (1986 as amended).
The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property is the sum of any money
received plus the fair value of the property (other than money) received. Id. § 1001(b). As
foreign currency, LCs are treated as personal property, instead of money under the Code. See
19891
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swap programs, a strong argument can be made that a significant dis-
count will apply.10 The pronouncements of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) suggest that this is the position of the account-
ing profession for financial statement purposes.1 t This alternative, how-
generally McGarry, The Taxation of Exchange Gains and Losses: A Road Map, 14 INT'L TAX
J. 25, 25-26 (1988). Fair market value is the price at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell.
Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), 60-2 USTC 1 9484, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 918 (1960). Fair market value is always a question of fact. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as
amended in 1972).
10. Restrictions on the use of property decrease its value. Barlow v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1373 (1975).
11. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in conjunction with Deloitte,
Haskin & Sells, first focused on this question in April, 1987, when it released an Emerging
Issues Task Force Issue Summary (Issue Summary). The Issue Summary considered the ac-
counting implications of the following scenerio.
Facts
A United States company (Company) with operations in Mexico purchases a United
States dollar-denominated loan from a financial institution for $5 million. The loan, owed by a
Mexican debtor, is in the principal amount of $10 million. Pursuant to the rules and regula-
tions of Mexico's official debt-for-equity swap program, the Mexican government purchases
the loan from Company for $8.5 million worth of Mexican pesos, computed at current eX-
change rates. Upon its purchase of the loan, the Mexican government remits the pesos to the
Mexican subsidiary of Company (Subsidiary)and Subsidiary subsequently issues capital stock
to Company. There is an agreement with the Mexican government which restricts the re-
demption of the stock, dividend payments and sales of the stock to Mexicans for a stated
period of time. Additionally, thepesos obtained on the conversion are required to be used for a
specified purchase in the Mexican operation (such as to make a capital expenditure). These
provisions are designed to retain the pesos in the Mexican economy.
Company theoretically receives new stock in Subsidiary worth $8.5 million in exchange
for only a $5 million investment. The Issue Summary examines five alternatives for accounting
for this $3.5 million credit (Credit).
1. Alternative 1 - No Recognition of the Credit As Income
Under this alternative, Subsidiary does not recognize any income because the fair market
value of the Credit must be discounted to properly reflect the effects of the restrictions imposed
by the Mexican government. The fair market value of the pesos is determined by and equal to
the amount the Company paid for the Mexican loan in the secondary market. Thus, the ex-
change rate of the $8.5 million in pesos received would be discounted down to $5 million and,
as a result, the recorded value of Subsidiary's net assets would equal the Company's invest-
ment in Subsidiary. This alternative, however, would conflict with FASB Statement 52 be-
cause it would have required discounting of the current exchange rate.
2. Alternative 2 - No Recognition of the Credit as Current Income. Classify the Credit
as a Deferred Credit or as a Component of Stockholder's Equity (Similar to Transla-
tion Adjustment) in the Balance Sheet.
Under this alternative, Subsidiary does not recognize income currently because the re-
strictions on Subsidiary's capital stock and the instability of the Mexican economy make ulti-
mate distribution of the Credit to the Company unlikely. Recognition of the Credit is instead
deferred until there has been some true event of a realization, such as when Subsidiary distrib-
utes the Credit to the Company. Until such an event occurs, the Credit would be classified on
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ever, retains the risk that on audit the IRS will challenge the discount
applied, thereby increasing the likelihood that some gain will result.
the balance sheet as a deferred Credit or, alternatively, as a component of stockholder's equity,
similar to the classification for translation adjustments.
3. Alternative 3 - Treat the Credit in the Same Manner As a Credit Excess Associated
With A Consolidated Subsidiary Or an Equity Method Investee
Under this alternative, the Credit is not recognized as a current income because it stems
from the capital contribution made to Subsidiary by the Company. Since a capital contribu-
tion is not the culmination of the earnings process required for triggering income recognition,
the Company must record its investment in Subsidiary at cost. The Credit, which represents
the difference between the Company's $5 million investment in Subsidiary and Subsidiary's
equity of $8.5 million, would be accounted for according to its nature in the Company's con-
solidated financial statements. For example, if the Credit could be identified to specific ac-
counts within the financial statements, such as assets acquired by the Subsidiary, the Credit
should be allocated as a component of such accounts. If the Credit could not be specifically
identified, it is accounted for in a manner similar to an unallocated Credit excess that arises in
a purchase business combination, i.e. negative goodwill.
4. Alternative 4 - Recognize the Credit Currently in Income.
Under this alternative, the Credit is considered realized by the consolidated entity because
thepesos contributed by the Mexican government to Subsidiary results in an increase in Sub-
sidiary's net worth and cash flow. This realization is deemed sufficient for recognition of in-
come.
5. Alternative 5 - Recognize the Credit in Income Based on the Way the Debt-For-
Equity Swap Program Requires the Pesos to be Used
Under this alternative, the Credit is recognized in accordance with the way thepesos are
required to be used by Subsidiary. Thus, for example, if as part of the swap agreement the
Mexican government required Subsidiary to use the pesos to purchase equipment, the Credit
derived from the swap would be amortized to income of the expected useful life of the asset
acquired with the pesos. Alternatively, if the pesos were used to pay a portion of the subsidi-
ary'speso debt, Company would recognize the Credit as a gain from extinguishment of debt in
its consolidated financial statements.
The Issue Summary suggested alternatives for consideration, but did not provide guidance
as to an acceptable practice for companies to follow. The FASB Emerging Issues Task Force
(Task Force) has established the following generally accepted accounting principles for dealing
with swaps. The excess credit in local currency realized in a swap should be used to reduce the
basis of the long-lived asset acquired or constructed by the foreign subsidiary pursuant to the
swap agreement. The basis for allocation to long-lived assets appeared to be based on the view
that the underlying motivation to foreign governments in permitting swaps is the lock-up of
long term investment in local assets.
This credit is allocated as follows. First, the United States company should reduce or
eliminate the basis of the long-lived fixed assets it acquired or constructed with the swap pro-
ceeds. The excess should be applied next to reduce or eliminate the basis of existing fixed
assets. In both instances the assets are selected in the order of their remaining useful life, with
the longest one used first. Any remaining excess should be reported as excess of fair market
value of risk that on audit the IRS will challenge the discount applied, thereby increasing the
likelihood that some gain will result in assets acquired over cost-negative goodwill. Thus, for
accounting purposes, the debt-for-equity swap will result in no immediate gain recognition.
Pursuant to Accounting Principles Board Opinion 16, this negative goodwill is amortized sys-
tematically to income over the period estimated to be benefited, but not to exceed 40 years.
The following example illustrates the Task Force findings:
Assume Company X, a Delaware corporation, purchases SlO million of face value debt
owed by a Mexican debtor for $5 million. X delivers this debt to the Mexican government,
1989]
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2. Blocked Income
Alternatively, the company which swaps debt could treat the gain as
"blocked income" which is not recognized for United States tax purposes
until it becomes unblocked. 12 Generally, a United States parent corpora-
tion does not include the earnings and profits of a controlled foreign cor-
poration (CFC) when those earnings and profits are subject to a foreign
country's currency restriction throughout the 150 day period begining 90
days before the close of the taxable year and ending 60 days after the
close of the taxable year."3 Since debt-for-equity swap programs gener-
ally impose restrictions on the repatriation of dividends or capital, it is
possible to argue that any gain on the swap should be deferred until the
currency becomes unblocked. However, the IRS :requires taxpayers to
report blocked income in order to have the benefit of the deferral.14 This
forces the corporation to make a difficult decision between admitting the
receipt of income but claiming it is deferred or arguing that no gain at all
was recognized in the transaction. 5 Although a preliminary draft of
Revenue Ruling 87-124 indicated that under certain circumstances the
gain on a swap might be deferred under the blocked income rules, that is
not the Treasury's current position.
16
which pays $8.5 million in pesos to X's Mexican subsidiary, Y. Y issues $8.5 million (in pesos)
of capital stock to X. Y uses the proceeds to buy $I million (in pesos) worth of Machines. Tile
remainder is left in cash. Y's existing fixed assets consist of $2 million (in pesos) worth of
Cranes. For purposes of X's consolidated financial statements, Y's Machine and Cranes would
have 0 value and X would have a $500,000 amount shown as excess of fair market value of
assets acquired over cost ($3,500,000 excess,- $3,000,000 elimination of basis).
12. I.R .C. § 964(b) (1988). See generally Dionne, Revenue Ruling on Debt/Equity Swaps
Leaves Unanswered Questions-Td the Delight of the Tax Bar, 39 TAX NOTES 166, 169 (1988).
13. The regulations define blocked currency as "earnings and profits of a controlled for-
eign corporation ... [that are] subject to a currency or other restriction or limitation ..... "
Treas. Reg. § 1.964-2(a) (1988). The restriction must prevent the ready conversion into
United States dollars, conversion into currency convertible into dollars, or conversion into
property of a type normally owned by the CFC or prevent the CFC from distributing a divi-
dend to its United States shareholders.
14. Rev. Rul. 74-351, 1974-2 C.B. 144 as modified by Rev. Rul. 81-290, 1981-2 C.B. 108.
A taxpayer treating income as blocked income must report the amount of blocked income in
foreign currency.
15. See Dionne, supra note 12, at 171.
16. The preliminary draft of Rev. Rul. 87-124 is available from TAX NOTES as document
88-3911. This document was not officially released. That draft ruling held that the Unitcd
States parent corporation may elect to defer reporting any gain resulting from the sale because
the income is blocked. Rev. Rul. 74-351, 1974-2 C.B. 144. The sole difference between the
draft and final ruling was that in the draft ruling limitations on dispositions of stock and
dividend payments were imposed on the foreign investor. The foreign investor could not sell
or otherwise dispose of the stock it is required to invest for a ten year period, and no distribu-
tions with respect to the stock could be made for a five year period.
The Service does not currently recognize that the blocked income rules will apply, Robert
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3. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co.
One could also take the position that as a matter of law, the restric-
tions placed on the foreign investment require that the market value of
the currency equal the United States company's investment. Conse-
quently, the transaction does not result in a gain. This doctrine has its
origins in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 7 in which
the Court of Claims held that when the fair market value of property
received is unascertainable, the fair market value of the property received
is equal to the fair market value of the property surrendered. However,
IRS officials have stated that this interpretation is incorrect because the
court's statements on that issue are only dicta. Consequently, Philadel-
phia Park Amusement Co. has no precedential value.1  In dictum in
United States v. Davis,19 the Court stated that "absent a readily ascertain-
able value it is accepted practice to hold, as did the Court of Claims in
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, that the values 'of the
two properties exchanged in an arms length transaction are either equal
in fact, or are presumed to be equal.' "20 Therefore, the IRS's analysis of
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. represents a very narrow reading of
the case which would probably not withstand challenge.
4. Contribution to Capital
It is also possible to argue that the excess of the value of local cur-
rency, if any, over the United States company's investment is a contribu-
tion to the capital of the foreign subsidiary. Non-shareholder
contributions to capital are excluded from a corporation's taxable income
Katcher, Chief of Branch 5 in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel (International) who was respon-
sible for preparing Rev. Rul. 87-124 posited a situation where the restricted LCs obtained in
the debt-for-equity swap freed up other LCs for unrestricted use, conversion, or repatriation as
a situation where the blocked income rules would not apply. Dionne, supra note 12, at 171.
17. 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954), 54-2 USTC 9697. In Philadelphia Park Amusement
Co., the taxpayer had constructed a bridge in connection with a 50 year franchise granted by
the City of Philadelphia to construct and operate a passenger railway. When the taxpayer's
financial condition prevented him from making necessary repairs to the bridge, the taxpayer
transferred the bridge to the city in exchange for a 10-year extension of its franchise. When
the taxpayer abandoned the franchise it claimed a loss deduction for the undepreciated cost of
the bridge as the value of the franchise to be amortized over its remaining term. The court
held that the cost of the franchise was equal to the value of the bridge stating that "the fair
market value of the 10 year extension of the franchise should be established but, if that value
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the fair market value of [the bridge] should be
established and that will be presumed to be the value of the extended franchise." Id. at 187.
18. Dionne, supra note 12, at 168. IRS Officials stated that because the case was re-
manded to determine the value of the franchise, it had no precedential value. Id.
19. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
20. Ia at 72.
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by Internal Revenue Code section 118.21 Section 118 is a codification of
the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. Cuba R.R.22 which stated
that non-shareholder contributions to capital were not income subject to
taxation by the sixteenth amendment.
Governments frequently make contributions to corporations, in
which they have no ownership interest and without receiving any goods
or services, in order to obtain indirect benefits from the corporation's
operations. The exclusion for contributions to capital specifically in-
cludes contributions made for the purpose of inducing the corporation to
locate its business in a particular community or for the purpose of en-
abling the corporation to expand its existing business.23 If the restricted
local currency has a value in excess of the United States corporation's
investment, that excess should be considered a contribution to capital by
the foreign government made for the purpose of encouraging the United
States corporation to invest there. The value of the United States corpo-
ration's investment should not be considered to be in excess of its cash
investment since the restrictions on repatriations of capital and dividends
cause the excess value of the local investment, if any, to be unlike the
corporation's ordinary income.24
D. The New York State Bar Association Report
Revenue Ruling 87-124 was criticized in a report recently published
by the New York State Bar Association (Report).23 The Report con-
cluded that the ultimate commercial result in each of the three transac-
tions discussed in Revenue Ruling 87-124 is essentially the same.
Consequently, the three transactions should be analyzed in a consistent
fashion. The Report agreed with the IRS's conclusion that X recognized
a loss of forty dollars as a result of the swap. The forty dollars represents
the difference between its one hundred dollar basis in the obligation and
the sixty dollars it received in the transaction. However, the Report dis-
agreed with the conclusion that Y has a gain to the extent that the value
of 900 restricted LCs is greater than sixty dollars. This gain realization is
a result of the transaction being characterized as Y purchasing the debt
21. I.R.C. § 118 (1986). See generally Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to
Corporate Capital, 82 HARV. L. REV. 619 (1969); Landis, Contributions to Capital of Corpora.
tions, 24 TAX L. REV. 241 (1969).
22. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960).
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25. Report on Developing Country Debt-Equity Swaps, Dec. 1, 1988, reprinted In TAX
NOTEs TODAY, Dec. 6, 1988 at 244-319.
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from X and redeeming the debt for the 900 LCs. The 900 LCs are subse-
quently contributed to FX.
The Report concludes that a better characterization of the transac-
tion is X redeeming the debt for 900 LCs, and Y contributing sixty dol-
lars to FX, which uses these funds to purchase the 900 LCs from X.
Consequently, although X realizes a forty dollar loss, Y does not recog-
nize any gain. Y did not have any interest in acquiring the FC debt as an
investment but acquired it solely to participate in the debt-for-equity
swap program. The entire series of transactions that comprise the swap
were required by the terms of the debt-for-equity swap program and are
carried out pursuant to signed agreements that obligate the parties to
carry out all the steps of the swap. Consequently, as a matter of both
form and substance, Y never acquired the debt, nor any of the LCs.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to characterize the transaction in any way
that treats Y as directly owning either the debt or the LCs, which is an
integral component of the Revenue Ruling's analysis of Y's role in the
swap. Instead, the transaction's effect is as though Y had invested sixty
dollars in exchange for all the stock of FX and consequently Y does not
recognize any gain.
Even if the transaction is characterized in some form that treats Yas
directly acquiring the debt or the LCs, the Report concluded that the
rule of Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. requires that the value of either
the debt or the LCs surrendered by Y be fixed at sixty dollars, with the
result that Y does not recognize a gain.
The Report's analysis of Situation 2 in the Revenue Ruling agrees
with the analysis adopted by the IRS. X recognizes a loss on the swap to
the extent that the fair market value of the LCs is less than its basis in the
debt. Although the swap could alternatively be characterized as a contri-
bution of the debt to FX which redeems it for 900 LCs, this characteriza-
tion is inappropriate because most countries do not allow their foreign
debt to be held by domestic entities. Furthermore, if the obligation were
deemed to have been transferred to FX, that step should be disregarded
because of FX's transitory ownership of the obligation.
I. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
A safer route would be to let the creditor bank initially make the
conversion and realize the difference between the secondary market price
and the redemption price paid by the Central Bank (gain spread). Since
the bank has credits in its portfolio, it does not need to go to the secon-
dary market to purchase it. There will, as a result, be no gain spread.
1989]
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Instead, the bank will simply reduce its loss on the credit, which will now
be limited to the difference between its basis and the value of the local
equity received. The value of the local equity received should be immedi-
ately determinable because the investing United States corporation will
pay a specified sum of United States dollars for it. That amount would
represent the cost basis to the United States corporation.
If the bank contemplated selling its foreign credit in the secondary
market at a significant discount, it should be willing to sell the shares to
the United States corporation at approximately the same rate (after ad-
justment for additional expenses and possibly a small premium). Thus,
each party will come out in approximately the same economic position as
with the direct swap without the negative United States tax
consequences.
Although previous banking regulations would have made this alter-
native difficult to achieve, recent changes in Regulation K should permit
this to occur.26 Some risk remains that the IRS would assert the step
26. Before August of 1987, Regulation K of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 211
(1986), and the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1982), prevented banks
from holding equity interests greater than 20% in foreign corporations. Money center banks
were thus relegated to selling their Latin American debt at deep discounts in the secondary
market. This was their only realistic participation in the debt-for-equity swap. However, in-
tensive lobbying by various banking groups put pressure on the regulators to permit banks or
bank holding companies to acquire greater equity interests in foreign corporations. The new
liberalization of Regulation K has now permitted banks to directly swap their debt for equity
in Latin American corporations.
Regulation K permits bank holding companies to purchase and hold one hundred percent
of the shares in foreign financial companies. On August 12, 1987 Regulation K was liberalized
so that bank holding companies could swap their Latin American debt for a one hundred
percent equity stake in a public.sector, non-financial Latin American company which was
being privatized by the debtor nationals. However, the liberalization was not broad enough
because the bank holding companies were required to sell the stock within five years of the
acquisition date, and bank holding companies still could not own an equity interest in non-
financial, private sector companies. But nevertheless, this liberalization of Regulation K was a
major stepping stone for banks to be able to directly participate in debt-for-equity swaps,
Regulation K was amended for the second time in February of 1988. The amendment
made sweeping changes in the manner in which a bank holding company could participate in
debt-for-equity swaps. Most significantly, the amendment now permits bank holding compa-
nies to acquire up to forty percent of the shares of a foreign non-financial private company
when the sovereign debt obligations are swapped for an ownership interest in private compa-
nies. Second, the amended Regulation K also permits United States banking firms to invest in
foreign companies based in heavily indebted nations for a longer period of time than was cur-
rently permissible under the previous Regulation K. A bank holding company can now keep
an equity interest in an overseas corporation for up to fifteen years. However, the bank must
report to the Fed on its plans for divestiture on the tenth anniVersary of the acquisition and
two years before the end of the holding period. Third, Board approval is only required when:
(a) the amount to be invested is greater than fifteen. milli6n dollars ($15.0 M) or one percent of
the bank holding company's equity capital after goodwill is deducted; (b) the country's debt-
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transaction doctrine and try to impose the result of Situation 1 in Reve-
nue Ruling 87-124. However, a closer analysis of the step transaction
doctrine indicates that the two transactions should be treated differently.
A. The Step Transaction Doctrine
The step transaction doctrine is a judicially created doctrine which
permits a series of separate transactions to be recharacterized and treated
as a single integrated transaction if the steps are closely related and fo-
cused toward a particular end result.27 This general principal has been
the subject of various judicial interpretations. The most common inter-
pretation of this doctrine is the "mutual interdependence" test which al-
lows separate transactions to be stepped together if they are so
interdependent that the legal relations created by each transaction would
be fruitless without the others.28 Another common interpretation of the
doctrine is the "end result" test under which if a taxpayer intends a series
of transactions to reach a particular result, the transactions may be
recharacterized in ways that reach the same result.29 Although the step
transaction doctrine has never been applied to a foreign debt-for-equity
swap, several private rulings have considered whether the doctrine ap-
plies to domestic debt-for-equity swaps.30 These transactions are gener-
ally not considered to fall within the step transaction doctrine.
for-equity swap program requires the investor to invest new money in addition to swapping the
debt obligation; and then only if the new money portion of the investment is greater than
fifteen million dollars; or (c) the investment is made through an insured bank or its subsidiary.
Fourth, the bank holding company can provide loans or financing up to fifty percent of the
total loans and extensions of credit to their affiliate company. The fifty percent requirement
was instituted to insure that the company would have to obtain fifty percent of its credit
outside of the bank and thus prove its credit worthiness. Fifth, if the bank holding company
acquires greater than twenty-five percent of the control of the private sector, non-financial,
foreign company, another shareholder must own a larger block of shares. This provision in-
sures that the bank will not be the controlling shareholder in the corporation. Finally, the
Regulation permits the bank holding company to have membership on the firm's board of
directors or management committees.
The liberalization of Regulation K has had a significant impact on the bank's role in debt-
for-equity swaps. No longer are banks required to sell their debt at a high discount in the
secondary markets. Now, banks can directly swap their debt-for-equity in Latin American
companies.
27. See generally Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step Transaction Doc-
trine, 60 TAXES 970 (1982); Mintz & Plumb, Step-Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations,
12 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. OF FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
28. See, eg., McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1982), 82-2 USTC 9581.
29. King Enterprises v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969), 69-2 USTC 1 9720.
30. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-007 (May 28, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-08-003 (May 22,
1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-006 (May 18, 1987).
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Recharacterizing this proposed transaction as Situation I in Reve-
nue Ruling 87-124 would require a reversal of the order of the transac-
tions, because in the proposed transaction the conversion of the debt into
equity is the first step in the transaction instead of the last.31 Courts are
usually reluctant to reverse the order of steps when applying the step
transaction doctrine.32 Furthermore, recharacterizing the transaction
would not be a better portrayal of the substance of these transactions.33
So long as the bank was not acting as the United States company's agent,
the bank bears a risk that the purchaser would not purchase the stock.
In Situation 1, there is no risk that the bank will 'be left holding stock
because it sells its debt for cash. If a bank were anxious enough to sell its
foreign debt that it was willing to assume the risk that the transaction
would not go through and it would be left holding the stock, the transac-
tion would likely withstand scrutiny under the step transaction doctrine.
Of course, this additional risk may deter banks from engaging in a trans-
action of this type. If the transaction were structured in such a way that
the bank bore little or no risk that it would not be able to sell the stock,
then the bank's purchase of the stock might be seen as lacking legal sig-
nificance and the transaction might be recharacterized as Situation 1
under the step transaction doctrine.
It may be possible for the bank to bear a greater risk on paper than
actually exists. The bank would almost certainly not acquire the stock
unless it was certain to be able to immediately resell it.34 There is no
doubt that if the United States company wishes to have cordial relations
with its banks in the future, it will in no case fail to purchase the stock.
31. In addition to the New York State Bar Association Report, at least one other com-
mentator has argued that the step transaction doctrine requires that the transactions described
in Rev. Rul. 87-124 be recharacterized as simply a $60 investment in the stock of FX. Terry,
Debt Equity Swaps;Analysis ofRev. Rul. 87-124, 17 TAX MGMT. INT'L 151 (1988). 's partic-
ipation in the debt equity swap program is for the purpose of investing in FX, without a moti.
vation to invest in the obligations of FC in the hope of realizing a gain thereon. The steps must
therefore be combined under the end result test. The debt equity swap program only creates
another exchange rate for investments in the stock of country C. The same result can be
reached under the "mutual interdependence" test since "[i]t is evident from the facts that it
would not have taken the first two steps of buying the obligation and of exchanging it for
foreign currency if it could not have taken the final step of making foreign currency available
to its foreign subsidiary." Id. at 154.
32. See, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), acq., 1978-1 C.B. 2, af'd on
other grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975); Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1973); Rev. Rul. 78-192, 78-1 C.B. 83; Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.
1953), rev'd, 18 T.C. 164 (1952), cert. denied., 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
33. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-35-007 (May 28, 1987).
34. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-38-003 (May 22, 1987); see also Chirelstein & Lopata, supra
note 27, at 972.
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Therefore, it is possible for the transactions to be independently recog-
nized for tax purposes with little additional economic risk to the bank.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proper tax characterization of debt-for-equity swaps remains
unsettled. Although the IRS has attempted to provide guidance in Reve-
nue Ruling 87-124, that guidance is flawed. The IRS's result-oriented
analysis ignores the commercial reality of debt-for-equity swaps.
Although it is evident that a multinational bank that participates in the
swap should recognize a loss, the IRS has incorrectly concluded that the
multinational company recognizes a gain as a result of the swap. There
are a number of arguments that indicate that no gain should be recog-
nized. The principles underlying the concepts of income, realization, and
form over substance, require that the gain, if any, go untaxed at the time
of the swap. The IRS's conclusion to the contrary in Revenue Ruling 87-
124 ignores these fundamental principles and is unlikely to withstand a
court challenge.
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